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              Incorporating languages into histories of war: a research journey 
 
Abstract 
This article discusses the ways in which languages can be integrated into histories of 
war and conflict by exploring ongoing research  in two case studies: the liberation 
and occupation of Western Europe (1944-47), and peacekeeping/peace building in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-2000).The article suggests that three methodological 
approaches have been of particular value in this research: adopting an historical 
framework; following the ‘translation’ of languages into war situations; and 
contextualizing the figure of the interpreter/translator. The process of incorporating 
languages into histories of conflict, the article argues, has helped to uncover a 




Traditional historical scholarship on war has been markedly ethnocentric. Military 
historians, in what is still predominantly an Anglophone discipline, tend to adopt a 
nation-state ontology of conflict, eschewing what Tarak Barkawi calls the, „cultural 
mixing and hybridity of war‟ (2006, x), in favour of a state against state, them against 
us framework in which „foreignness‟ is positioned as an unproblematic given whose 
qualities are largely irrelevant to the themes that are being considered. In general, 
when languages appear in these narratives, they do so at the end of the story, 
represented as elements which are essentially benign, ancillary parts of those 
diplomatic relations which bring a conclusion to war (Roland 1999), or sources of 
useful pedagogic lessons for the post war period, like those which could be drawn 
from the US Forces‟ communicative language teaching techniques in the 1940s 
(Goodman 1947; Parry 1967). To date, the only detailed historical examination of a 
language policy within war itself is Elliott and Shukman‟s work on the secret 
classrooms of the Cold War (2002), and this is a study which concerns itself not with 
languages themselves, but rather with the social and cultural impacts which a 
programme of national language training might have on the servicemen concerned. 
More recently however, some historians engaged with pre-twentieth century conflicts 
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have begun to question the traditionally accepted linguistic nationalism of the armies 
which were fighting in Europe in the medieval and early modern periods. Thus 
Kleinman (2009) traces the presence of Irish participants in the French armies of the 
late eighteenth century, and Butterfield (2009) challenges the monolithic 
„anglophoneness‟ of British identity previously taken for granted by the majority of 
historians of the Hundred Years War. Such instances of the historical inclusion of 
languages are however rare. On the whole, the historiography of war continues to 
develop its key research questions within contexts which are foreign language free. In 
the Western historical academy, the business of military action conducted with or 
against different national and ethnic groups is typically assumed to be a monolingual 
operation, achieved through the language of the dominant force, or at least that of the 
observing historian or war studies commentator. 
   If war historians are largely uninterested in languages however, linguists and 
translation scholars have shown themselves to be increasingly curious about war and 
conflict, and in particular about the role that language intermediaries, interpreters and 
translators, might play in military situations (Apter 2006; Baker M. 2006; Dragovic-
Drouet 2007; Inghilleri 2008, 2009; Rafael 2007; Salama-Carr 2007; Simon 2005; 
Stahuljak 2000, 2010). Often informed by a legacy of thought from cultural studies 
and literary theory (Bermann and Wood 2005), such researchers have sought to 
enlarge contemporary concepts of translation in ways which might be appropriate to 
„translating culture in an age of political violence‟ (Tymoczko 2009, 179). Stahuljak 
(2000) for example has called on frameworks of testimony and witness in order to 
understand the voices of interpreters in conflict, whilst Baker has drawn on narrative 
theory to position translators as participants in the construction of war narratives 
(Baker M. 2006, 2010), and Inghilleri‟s Bourdieusian approach positions interpreters 
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within the social and professional contexts of war (2005, 2009.). The result of this not 
inconsiderable body of research has been to emphasise the complex and multi-faceted 
roles of translators in conflict situations, thereby making important contributions to 
broader debates in translation studies concerning for example translator agency, and 
the ethics of translation itself. For these translation specialists, languages, far from 
being absent from military activity, are in effect part of the very institution of war, 
„essential for circulating and resisting the narratives that create the intellectual and 
moral environment for violent conflict‟ (Baker M. 2006, 2).  
   What is interesting at this present time however is the wide gap which continues to 
exist between these two distinct parts of the academy - between the perception of 
translation studies scholars that language intermediaries are vital to war, and the total 
absence of languages, their occlusion, in the narratives which most historians 
construct of conflict and peace building. To some extent, one might argue that the 
failure to connect these two approaches has at its root the very distinct methodological 
traditions of the two disciplines - translation studies and history. In translation studies, 
much of the most innovative work on languages and war has been stimulated by 
recent Western deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan: „You don‟t make war without 
knowing why? The decision to interpret in Iraq‟ (Inghilleri 2010); „The ethical task of 
the translator in the geo-political arena from Iraq to Guantánamo Bay‟ (Inghilleri 
2008); „Relationships of Learning between Military Personnel and  Interpreters in 
Situations of Violent Conflict‟ ( Tipton 2011); „ Translation, American English, and 
the National Insecurities of Empire‟ (Rafael 2009). In this research, conclusions about 
the place of languages in war are generally made on the basis of data relating to these 
contemporary deployments, with an implicit assumption that the position of the 
interpreter in such conflicts is likely to be somewhat similar to that in other wars; that 
 4 
war, and therefore the interpreter‟s role within it, will not necessarily change from one 
conflict to another. Historians on the other hand, whilst accepting that there are 
clearly tragic constants in war-making – killing, the victimisation of the innocent, the 
inequality of army/civilian relationships – generally view the activities associated 
with conflict as radically context-dependent, as being framed by those particular 
historical and geopolitical circumstances which have produced the war in the first 
place. Just as most historians would be uneasy extrapolating from one particular war 
in order to generalise about something like soldier/civilian relations, so any template 
of interpreter activity in conflict outside the specifically drawn circumstances of a 
particular war is likely to be viewed by historians as potentially unhistorical.  
   This article argues that it may be possible to bring the two sides of this academic 
debate into a closer dialogue, reconciling the emphasis on the role of interpreters 
/translators in war and the historical specificity of particular military situations within 
a broader perspective which seeks to uncover the role of „languages‟ ( as opposed to 
language intermediaries) in war. The AHRC project on which the article is based - 
Languages at War: policies and practices of language contacts in conflict                                                     
(www.reading.ac.uk/languages-at-war/) -  has as its aim the integration of languages 
into historical accounts of war, their embedding within narratives of conflict and 
peace building. Seeking to include languages in accounts of war, we rapidly 
discovered in this project, is to enter virtually uncharted methodological waters. In 
practice, our methodology has been developing incrementally as the project has 
progressed in relation to the material examined, the interviews conducted, and 
ongoing discussions with colleagues from a variety of disciplines: war studies 
historians, peacekeeping analysts, ethnographers, and translation studies specialists. 
Like Pym, we believe that, „historians should grapple quite directly with their 
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material, getting their hands dirty before elaborating any grand principles concerning 
the methodology of their task‟ (Pym 1998, viii). The Languages at War project is still 
ongoing, so that the suggestions that follow are largely provisional, reports back, as it 
were, from the research front. This article however outlines three broad approaches 
which we have found particularly helpful in integrating languages into accounts of 
war: adopting an historical framework; following the „translation‟ of languages into 
war situations; and contextualizing the figure of the interpreter/translator.  
Adopting an historical framework 
Adopting an historical framework assumes a priori that there is no such thing as a 
typical war, that each conflict will have its own peculiar context. Conflict situations 
bring together a range of variables: the purpose and focus of the mission, the 
constitution of the military forces, the modes of encounter with civilians, and the 
composition and attitudes of local people. What tasks for example have the military 
been given in any particular conflict? Are they to occupy a country, liberate an area, 
pacify a region, make peace between warring groups, or build a long term and stable 
peace? Is their deployment expected to be short-term or extensive? Are the armies 
drawn from one nationality, or several? Have they been deployed as a national group, 
or are they organised with others, either in a loose coalition of foreign partners, or in a 
tighter treaty organisation? On the ground, do they seek to have direct relations with 
foreign civilians through their own personnel, or do they delegate some of these 
encounters to third party nationals, recruited directly „on the ground‟, or brought in by 
a civilian agency?  How do local attitudes towards the military differ according to the 
particular groups involved, and how do these attitudes change over time, perhaps 
mirroring the behaviour of the armies concerned and/or the evolution of the conflict 
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itself? A robust analysis of languages data in war, we discovered, needs to be situated 
in this way, and to take account of key contextual issues. 
    In the Languages at War project, our approach has been to examine two specific 
case studies – the liberation and occupation of Western Europe (1944-47), and 
peacekeeping/peace building in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-2000) - selected as 
potentially providing different settings for the role of languages. In the Second World 
War, the mission given to Allied armies was to liberate enemy-occupied territories, 
and then to set up an occupation administration in Germany. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the military were positioned firstly as peacekeepers between hostile ethnic groups, 
and then as peace builders, seeking to contribute to new relationships for the future. In 
the 1940s struggle, Allied troops, although brought together in a coalition from a 
range of nations, largely fought on the ground as separate entities in different theatres 
of war. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Western armies were deployed as part of a wider 
peacekeeping force under the auspices of the UN/NATO, operating under national 
orders, but within a loose supra-national framework. In the Second World War, the 
huge armies of the Allied military were largely conscript soldiers, and 
overwhelmingly male. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the forces were formed from smaller 
professional armies into which women had been at least partially integrated. In the 
Second World War, local attitudes towards incoming foreign troops varied from 
initial welcome to irritation and growing hostility in liberated territories. In occupied 
Germany, civilians found themselves living in a country dominated by foreign armies 
and burgeoning foreign bureaucracies, subject to physical and mental deprivations, 
with relatively little personal freedom of manoeuvre. The particularities of each 
situation were clearly likely to frame language experiences : thus for example 
linguists working for a section of the British administration in Germany would be 
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operating in a very different context from those engaged by NATO in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
  Any historical approach relies on robust sources. As Aldrich has suggested, 
historians, „are ultimately what they eat‟ (2002, 149). Making visible the formerly 
invisible presence of languages, required, we found, the use of an eclectic and 
imaginative range of historical documents. Eclecticism of sources is of course partly a 
product of availability, of what can actually be found which is of relevance.  In the 
case of the Second World War, relevant archival sources were often abundant but had 
seldom, if ever, been examined by previous historians. Thus for example, the 
development of translating/interpreting institutions for the British occupation of 
Germany – some 4,800 hours of translation work demanded every week by July 1945 
- was clearly narrated in the records of the War Office and the Foreign Office. The 
way in which an Interpreters Pool had been established, with relevant personnel being 
recruited and tested, told us much about the often contradictory perceptions of 
security requirements - MI5 vetting typically rejected two out of every three 
candidates - and the urgency of operational needs. Initially, naturalized British 
subjects of allied or neutral origins, Eire nationals, or those of enemy origin were 
unable to work in the Pool, but by January 1945 demand for linguists was so heavy 
that most of these rules had been speedily relaxed. The addition of oral testimony 
(recorded by the Imperial War Museum before 2000) to this corpus of documentation 
provided a vivid picture of how these members of the Interpreters Pool actually 
operated on the ground, investigating war crimes, and interrogating prisoners of war. 
Newly recorded interviews with witnesses, focused specifically on languages in war, 
contributed an important additional element of participant self-reflection on the status 
and importance of languages over time (Tobia 2010 a,b.). In the case of Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, the conflict was too recent to have allowed for the archiving of a 
significant corpus of material in national collections and museums. In this situation, 
interviewing a wide range of participants was vital. Thus this case study recorded over 
fifty lengthy oral history interviews with locally recruited interpreters, military 
linguists, army personnel, and people working with NGOs and peacekeeping 
organisations, as well as using recently published memoirs from participants, and 
locally produced material. 
   An important aspect of the historical framework we adopted was a deliberate 
engagement with the relevant historiography in each case study. Chris Rundle and 
Kate Sturge in their work on translation history in fascist regimes have been at pains 
to take what they call an, „outward-looking approach to translation history‟ (Rundle 
and Sturge 2010, 3). This is both a matter of being informed about what questions are 
currently being posed in the general historiography, and seeking to inform, to 
contribute to this historiography by moving if necessary beyond the „comfort zone‟ of 
one‟s own initial discipline, both in publishing and in conference presentations. The 
analysis and coding of the rich oral material from the Bosnia case study yielded 
particularly valuable insights when placed within the context of existing scholarship 
on peacekeeping and strategic studies, and set alongside broader discussions of the 
nature of asymmetrical and gendered relationships in military and peace building 
operations. By contextualizing the primary material in this way, it was possible to 
produce a nuanced account of the role of languages in inter-relationships on the 
ground at the precise moment when a military organizational culture designed to 
facilitate war fighting was reorienting itself towards achieving peace and consent 
rather than victory (Baker, C. 2010 a, b). An understanding of the role of languages in 
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this conflict has been deepened by an engagement with wider discussions relating to 
peace keeping, stimulated by the Bosnia-Herzegovina struggle.  
    A classic case in which an understanding of the place of languages in conflict could 
arguably make some contribution to current historiography is that of the British 
Intelligence operation in the Second World War. The enormous and continuing 
critical attention given to the Bletchley Park phenomenon ( Hinsley, Simkins, and 
Howard 1979-90; Welchman 1982; Lewin 1978; Hinsley and Stripp 1994; Patterson 
2008) has never to date involved any analysis of the „foreignness‟ of the intelligence 
which was accessed, decrypted and utilized. In fact however the archives of Second 
World War Intelligence revealed in considerable detail the presence of a large and 
complex translation operation, with Naval Intelligence alone processing an average of 
18,000 translations per month in the spring of 1944, and huge amounts of additional 
non-coded material – 10 tons of German documents arriving after the Liberation of 
Paris – needing to be translated. Without linguists, it is clear that Britain‟s Intelligence 
system would not have been viable, let alone effective. Languages are, in a very real 
way, a „missing dimension‟ in historical discussions of intelligence at this period 
(Footitt 2010a). 
Following the ‘translation’ of languages into war situations 
Once the variables, sources and historiography of the case studies had been 
considered however, we still needed to develop approaches to uncovering the place of 
languages within the particular war situations. At an early stage in the project, we 
looked for what we termed, „language encounters‟, examples of language exchange 
between the military and the local population. Quite rapidly however it became 
evident that this magpie approach, in effect imposing a pre-determined languages 
framework on war, was incomprehensible to a large number of participants in both 
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conflicts, and bore little relation to what we were finding archivally. Increasingly we 
began to feel that discovering how languages were embedded in war situations would 
involve taking on some of the perspective of the military themselves, looking at the 
military chronology of events, examining the networks and associations which had 
produced the terms of any language exchange, and studying the physical as well as 
the verbal presence of languages on the ground of war. 
    Military operations, whether invasion or peacekeeping, tend to be organised in 
broad phases: pre-deployment, deployment (itself understood in discrete operational 
stages), and post deployment. Foreign Office committees, War Office reports, 
situation analyses, all followed this trajectory. Army participants interviewed related 
naturally to the military phases of operations, whilst civilian interviewees also placed 
their narratives within an overall military timescale, either by accepting the 
chronology presented, or positioning their experiences as implicit or explicit 
resistance to it. Adopting a military chronology of this sort made it possible for us to 
understand some of the conceptual heterogeneity of conflict: the competing agencies 
involved in pre-deployment preparations, and the experiences of different levels of 
operational command in distinct phases and geographies of the missions. In the case 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina for example, we found three periods of language support 
created by in-theatre operations at different times in the peacekeeping/peace building 
process. When British United Nations (UNPROFOR) troops first arrived in Vitez in 
November 1992, a hastily found military linguist recruited a handful of local 
interpreters, operating pragmatically with a small civilian language cell. With the 
deployment of a second British battalion, this cell approach was cascaded out. 
Although the international UNPROFOR headquarters were expected to manage 
language provision on the ground, their remoteness from the actual sites of operation 
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meant in effect that national contingents had to make their own language 
arrangements. The end of UNPROFOR‟s mission in December 1995, after the signing 
of the Dayton agreement, brought massive organisational change to the multinational 
military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this was reflected directly in the lives 
and employment opportunities of interpreters. These very specific military contexts 
conditioned the language experiences of all participants, and were used by 
interviewees as a way of framing their narratives.  
    Although military attitudes to foreign language provision appeared to be key in 
setting the terms of „on the ground‟ encounters, it proved initially difficult to find 
evidence of  explicitly named „language policies‟ which the military forces had 
adopted when preparing for their operations. Spolsky‟s „Language Management‟ 
approach was helpful in pointing out the influence which the organizational structure 
of an army – the different foreign language requirements of sergeant, commander, spy 
and occupier for example – could play in the formulation of policies. His corollary 
however that the military domain is a relatively easy arena in which to examine 
language management, „Because… an army is able to focus its resources and apply its 
in-built authority to language as well as its other goals‟ (Spolsky 2009, 143), is 
somewhat at odds with what we observed to be the political and military „messiness‟ 
of the actuality of war, and hence the difficulties inherent in establishing language 
policies for it. In contemporary armed forces for example, the place of foreign 
languages in pre-deployment preparations is very far from clear. Whilst „culture‟ is a 
term which the military prioritise and seek to integrate in their preparations, the space 
explicitly occupied by foreign languages is vague and uncertain. A recent Joint 
Doctrine paper, „The Significance of Culture to the Military‟, set out in detail the 
reasons why culture is important in war and suggested specific ways in which military 
 12 
capability in this area might be strengthened through cultural analysis templates and 
frameworks of cultural capability. Out of 508 closely argued paragraphs however, 
only three were devoted to the role of foreign languages. The evident epistemological 
unease about the relationship between language on the one hand and culture on the 
other positioned foreign languages as an essentialized entity, related to culture in 
some problematic and largely unexplored way, but distinctly separate from it: 
„Cultural and language capability are inextricably linked. An appreciation of culture 
facilitates the use of language, whilst linguistic skills facilitate the gaining and 
exploitation of cultural knowledge. However, knowledge of a language does not 
directly equate to knowledge of a culture. If language is what is said, culture 
influences what is meant‟ (Ministry of Defence 2009, 1/5).  
   In the case studies in this project the language implications of military deployment 
to a foreign country were often implicitly rather than explicitly addressed in policy 
terms, and usually in response to a complex nexus of factors in which perceptions of 
the „other‟, attitudes to one‟s own language, political objectives, and departmental in-
fighting were as important as the requirements of fast-moving military operations. 
Rather than starting from a platonic ideal of what „language policy‟ might be, or 
relating it solely to levels of organizational command, army institutional culture, or 
the employment of quasi professional linguists, we found it more helpful to start from 
the ground of conflict itself, tracing the ways in which the idea of foreign languages 
was, in Bruno Latour‟s formulation, „translated‟ into military preparations for 
deployment. For Latour, translation does not primarily refer to a linguistic notion, but 
rather to the stages by which an idea gradually moves into becoming a (scientific) 
fact, how a particular product/idea and the demand for that product/idea are 
simultaneously created. It is vital in this sense that, „the vocabulary of the actors‟ is 
 13 
heard loud and clear, in a landscape which is conceptually flattened so that  networks 
and associations can be followed, with no necessary distinction between the macro 
and the micro (Latour 2007, 30).  
   Looking at pre-deployment preparations for the Liberation of Western Europe for 
example, we explored how the networks involved in producing briefing materials for 
troops modified and negotiated their various interests, and hence how foreign 
languages were produced or „translated‟ into these war preparations. Following the 
development of the cultural briefing materials that came from such networks provided 
an understanding of language policy which was closely related to the authorities‟ own 
perceptions of their objectives as they prepared some three and a half million men for 
deployment to eight different continental countries. Thus, the political imperative to 
prevent troops behaving disrespectfully to liberated populations framed an idea of 
foreign languages as part of a tool kit for the „good ambassador‟ soldier. A desire to 
ensure that the trooper was aware of the existence of a language different from his 
native tongue, and that he would approach the liberated populations with courtesy 
produced specific advice on how to use English with politeness when speaking with 
foreign civilians („Don‟t shout when you are talking to a Dane‟), and sensible 
linguistic tips on how to communicate when you possess only a minimum competence 
in the foreign language („Never ask a question which requires a long answer: you 
won‟t understand‟). Planners‟ efforts were concentrated on suggesting the qualitative 
nature of imagined future relationships during the Liberation where it was hoped that 
mutual respect and patience would characterise civilian/military meetings (Footitt 
2010b.).  In the context of cultural preparations for troops, the presence of foreign 
languages was thus produced and given meaning in good behaviour guides, where 
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language etiquette, rather than any form of language competence, was what was 
considered to be important. 
   In deployment too, overall military policies translated languages into facts within 
the theatre of war, affecting the military forces, the local community, and those who 
moved between them as language intermediaries. The British occupation of Germany 
in the mid 1940s for example was characterised from the beginning by a desire to 
maintain social distance between governors and governed, establishing an apparatus 
and structure of administration which would be expressed solely in the native tongue 
of the occupiers. The only language of government was to be English: „ It is felt that 
the onus of understanding orders and instructions issued to the Germans should rest 
with the Germans, and that error of translation or speech should provide no 
justification for the Germans in failing to carry out our requirements‟.1 A briefing 
paper given to every new member of the Control Commission in Germany advocated 
a linguistic persona which differentiated between public presentation on the one hand, 
and private understanding on the other: „DO use English in your official dealings with 
the Germans; DON‟T try to air your knowledge of German; DO learn German and all 
you can about Germany and the Germans‟.2 As the administrative structures in the 
British zone of occupation developed, a battlement of Anglophone bureaucracy had to 
be replicated by a second ring of German personnel (some 30,584), charged with 
actually communicating the messages of the occupying authorities to German 
civilians, and implementing its orders. Such staff were often recruited in the first 
place because of their knowledge of English rather than because they were natural and 
enthusiastic supporters of British occupation policies. The language of the military 
served to create a hermetically sealed space for an English-speaking community, 
deliberately distanced from the surrounding locals: „At present foreigners live in a 
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world separate from that of the Germans….This means that there are two widely 
different worlds in Germany‟.3  
    In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the urgent military need to find English speakers among 
the local civilians inevitably gave status and employment to people who had linguistic 
skills to offer. To begin with these employees were often very young, students who 
had only just left high school but who possessed a reasonable level of English. The 
early period of deployment was one with an enormous demand for English speakers, 
when salaries were high, so that those who found employment - usually the young, 
and very often women - found themselves in a highly advantageous financial position 
in relation to the rest of their communities. Language requirements thus operated at 
this time to change the social and economic balance of the communities in question. 
The extreme pay differentials between employees of international organisations and 
their neighbours were to remain a characteristic of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina long 
after the Dayton agreement. Commenting on what lessons might be learned from this 
situation for the contemporary deployment in Kosovo, US diplomat Robert Barry 
commented: „We should not let the international agencies and NGOs coming to 
Kosovo do what they did in Bosnia – bid against each other for qualified local staff. 
Doing so results in people who should be the judges and editors becoming the drivers 
and interpreters at wages higher than cabinet ministers receive‟ (Barry 1999, 102).  
     The „translation‟ of languages into the theatre of war was of course as much 
physical as verbal. Languages were embodied on the ground of conflict, inscribed 
physically in the landscapes in which troops were deployed. Whatever the purposes of 
foreign troops entering a country – liberation, occupation, humanitarian assistance, 
peacekeeping – they effectively occupied its space, imposing their own geography on 
what was to them a deeply unfamiliar territory. Whether the military constructed new 
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bases or reused existing structures, it adapted local space to its own purposes, 
accommodating hundreds or thousands of foreign soldiers whose knowledge of the 
local languages was usually minimal. In this process, the cartography of the country 
was changed, and domestic maps remade. In Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, the maps of the international forces overlaid the boundaries of the 
coalition‟s three Multi-National Divisions. In 1944, the American Army mapped its 
supply routes around Cherbourg on roads it described as the „Green Diamond 
Highway‟ (Cherbourg-St-Lô, Cherbourg- Dol), and the „Red Ball Highway‟ (St-Lô-
Vire). The military presence inevitably affected the local topography, taking over 
buildings and radically changing their usage. By early 1945 for example, the 
Americans in Reims were occupying 17 factories, 41 garages, 5 cinemas, 4 dance 
halls, 3 barracks, 2 hospitals, 68 hotels, 12 restaurants, 122 flats, 260 rooms in private 
houses, 5 schools, the Stade Municipal, the town‟s music conservatory, public 
gardens, and 6 of the major arterial roads in the city.
4
  
   Formal and informal practices of renaming space are of course ubiquitous, exerting 
what Pratt describes as „the power of naming‟ (Pratt 1992, 33). In this process, a 
perception can develop that naming a space amounts to the same as possessing it, and 
that once one has the space already in one‟s possession, there is no real need to strive 
towards understanding. As Brossat noted (1994, 8), one of the very first actions of 
people in liberated France had been to tear down those physical marks of German 
occupation, the street signs and notices on buildings, which had marked out the 
enemy presence. In occupied Germany, the British authorities renamed the buildings 
they were using as offices and bases – „Lancaster House‟, „Stirling House‟ – replacing 
the original German nomenclature. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the foreign 
presence had implicitly arrived with the consent of all three main local politico-
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military forces, the way in which the local landscape was renamed in English (the 
working language of the coalition) was strikingly similar to what had happened in the 
Second World War. The anthropologist Coles recalled an incident in which a fellow 
election monitor, seeing English-language route names on a foreign map of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, initially thought that the mapped territory was part of the United States 
(2007, 63).  Officially mapped names aside, foreign soldiers often renamed the spaces 
around them as slang, abbreviating or corrupting hard-to-pronounce words. Thus in 
Bosnia, soldiers would call „Bugojno‟ „Bugonyo‟. „Gornji Vakuf‟ and „ Mrkonjic  
Grad‟ would become „GV‟ and „MG‟ respectively.5 In both case studies, naming by 
foreign troops served as a marking out of occupied spaces, a way of separating the in-
coming military from the local community, producing what some described in 
occupied Germany as a „compound atmosphere‟,6 or in the Balkans as a hyper-reality, 
„hyper-Bosnia‟ (Coles 2007, 64). Beyond the esoteric language/culture debates which 
persist today among sections of the Western military, these case studies suggested that 
languages were in fact „translated‟ into the theatre of war, embedded in overall 
military plans and chronology, operating in deployment to condition future encounters 
„on the ground‟, economically, socially and physically. 
Contextualizing the figure of the interpreter/translator  
In all this work, the figure of the language intermediary, the interpreter or translator, 
remained a crucially important aspect of Languages at War. Much of the recent 
research on interpreters in war has of course problematized the traditional paradigm of 
the interpreter as an ethically neutral mouthpiece. As Kahane, a member of the 
International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC), argued, this ideal of 
professional neutrality sits uneasily both with the history of interpreting, and with the 
demands of contemporary life: 
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The notion of the unsullied interpreter who extracts the essentials of a message and 
transforms them into another language without sharp edges and roughness in the 
interests of communication and on the fringes of the contexts and intentions that exist 
well beyond the act of communication is a recent idea – what are 60 years? – that sits 
awkwardly with the profession‟s history and with the world we live in (Kahane 2007). 
 
In much of translation scholarship, expectations of professional neutrality for the 
interpreter in war have largely given way to an acceptance that living with divided 
loyalties may be the inevitable lot of those who work as language intermediaries in 
war, a situation which could for example be actively exploited in order to support a 
particular cause (Tymoczko 2000; Stahuljak 2010), or passively accepted in order to 
disseminate public narratives associated with the conflict (Baker M. 2006). Expected 
or imagined loyalty/disloyalty however are situated concepts which may relate less to 
the particular role of an interpreter per se and more to the specific concatenation of 
circumstances which has constructed the theatre of war in the first place. Interpreters 
/translators are not only placed in the position of intermediaries, in between camps or 
groups of belligerents, but are also integrated within the ongoing development of the 
war situation. We felt increasingly in this project that contextualizing the interpreters 
/translators more overtly – placing them back within the particularities of the war 
situation – might help us to develop a focus broader than the loyal/disloyal trope, thus 
seeing language intermediaries as one of the elements within a more holistic 
landscape into which languages had been „translated‟.    
     In Bosnia-Herzegovina, even those foreign forces which had invested the most in 
military language training (such as the UK and the Dutch) were able to meet only a 
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small fraction of their linguistic needs themselves, so that the majority of those who 
interpreted for foreign forces were locals, selected for their spoken English, 
confidence and self-reliance. These people undoubtedly found themselves in a 
maelstrom of clashing loyalties, but it was a maelstrom which was arguably not that 
different from the clash of loyalties then engulfing the whole country. Most 
participants in the Bosnia-Herzegovina struggle were implicated in an ongoing 
process of contesting or acquiescing in others‟ attempts to situate them within 
collective identities: „locals‟, „internationals‟, „the Serbs‟, „the Croats‟, „the Muslims‟, 
„the Brits‟, „the UN‟, „townspeople‟, „refugees‟, and so on. The ethno-political logic 
of the war, and indeed of the peace settlement, conditioned these collectivising 
responses but they also had their roots in longer-term legacies of trust and mistrust. In 
effect interpreters were operating within the same field of clashing and dissonant 
loyalties as most of their fellow countrymen.
7
 What distinguished them of course was 
their perilous physical visibility at points of violent tension, their assumed proximity 
to the most foreign and supposedly neutral of all the groups (foreign peacekeepers), 
and their primary responsibility for achieving some kind of communication with the 
personnel they were tasked to meet. For locally recruited interpreters, working as a 
language intermediary in this situation was one means of recovering agency and 
selfhood in besieged cities or economically depressed post-war towns. Finding agency 
and individuality via normatively invisible acts of translation and interpretation could 
however pose major problems. Active subjectivity (playing on one particular ethnic 
identity in order to reconcile a difficult situation for example) could take an immense 
psychological toll on the individual ( Stankovic 2000). It might also conflict with the 
received contemporary wisdom of what an interpreter should actually be, as derived 
for example from crash courses at the Defence School of Languages in the UK, where 
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trainees were taught to minimize their presence in conversations: „At Molesworth 
(airbase), the Americans used to call the interpreters „lips‟. „Hey, lips‟ you know, and 
the lips would come over and do the interpreting and they were supposed to be 
invisible‟.8 
   By comparison with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European languages 
required by the military in the Second World War were much more widely available 
within the British context. Thus for example linguists needed for the Intelligence 
Service during the war could largely be recruited from within the national community. 
In the secret listening stations (Y stations) which were set up all around the coast of 
Britain to intercept messages from enemy aircraft and shipping, women already in 
uniform who could speak German were drafted in. This sort of linguistic fluency was 
most likely to have been acquired through an extensive period of residence in the 
country before the war, and the first wave of recruits accordingly tended to be middle 
class women, often educated outside the UK, from wealthy cosmopolitan 
backgrounds, aptly nicknamed in the circumstances „The Boarding School Girls‟ 
(Clayton 1980, 56). In comparison, personnel recruited to the Government‟s Code and 
Cypher School at Bletchley Park were required to have only a reading knowledge of 
the language: „enough German simply to read it (not to speak nor write it)‟, and this 
only if other desirable attributes – intellect, energy and common sense – were 
demonstrably present as well‟.9 The status accorded to those who worked as linguists 
at Bletchley Park was considerably higher than that of the operatives in the Y stations, 
a reflection both of the gender differential (men at Bletchley Park, women in the Y 
stations), and probably too of the greater respect accorded at that time to reading the 
language as opposed to speaking it. In both cases, the authorities recruited from the 
tried and tested networks of influence (public schools, Oxford and Cambridge, and 
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their related circles) so that those who acted as language intermediaries in this way 
were well integrated within the social and economic governing classes of the country. 
    When the Allies landed in continental Europe, and particularly when they were 
embarking on the occupation of Germany however, a much larger group of language 
intermediaries was needed, people who would be able to converse with the enemy, 
find out relevant intelligence, and investigate and prosecute war criminals. Rather 
than recruiting locally for these tasks, the Allied authorities placed greater reliance on 
the reservoir of 75,000 German and Austrian Jews who had come to Britain between 
1933 and 1939, of whom approximately one in seven had enlisted in the British army 
( Fry 2009, xi). These men and women, who had changed their names during the war 
years in order to avoid being treated as traitors if captured, wore British army 
uniform, and were generally keen to assimilate; „ we were British soldiers now, we 
didn‟t want to speak German‟.10  When interrogating a prisoner of war, or acting as an 
interpreter, these ex-refugees largely maintained their new British identity: „One 
didn‟t have to explain, I spoke German like a German of course {….}uhm it was 
while interrogating Germans, German soldiers that I might be asked how come you 
speak such good German, and at that point I might have to remind them that I was 
here asking questions, and they would please give the answers‟.11 Rather than being 
caught up in a nation-wide clash of loyalties as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, language 
intermediaries in the Second World War were marked by assimilation, either within 
the prevailing class structure, or within a British military identity which they had at 
least in part chosen. 
   It is true of course that placing language intermediaries within the specifics of the 
war situation and the „translation‟ of languages within it may offer few additional 
insights about the actual practices of interpreting in war. This more holistic approach 
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however - seeing interpreters/translators as one element in an overall linguistic 
landscape which has been produced by war – can serve to extend our understanding of 
the range of circumstances which has brought the interpreters to their present posts, 
and hence the gamut of personal and professional concerns they may have. In both 
case studies the figure of the interpreter came to embody some of the political, social 
and economic circumstances of the specific war. In a sense the language intermediary 
was exposed, not only as someone placed in between combatants at high points of 
danger, but also as the embodiment of those disruptions which particular wars and 
conflicts engender in their societies.   
Conclusions 
The approaches developed in this project have aimed to incorporate languages into 
accounts of conflict by a process of contextualization which seeks to uncover a 
languages landscape within war. The historical framework we adopted involved a 
consideration of the variables, sources and historiography specific to each case study. 
A desire to trace how languages were „translated‟ into war led us to look in detail at 
the military themselves, their chronology, the networks and associations which 
developed language policies, and the appearance of languages, both verbally and 
physically on the „ground of war‟. This holistic approach to perceiving languages 
meant that the language intermediary became one element within this linguistic 
landscape, situated within the particularities of the conflict, and exhibiting qualities 
which were as much related to the specifics of the conflict and the broader 
„translation‟ of languages, as to more general paradigms of interpreting/translating, 
whether professional or based on imagined loyalty/disloyalty. If incorporating 
languages into histories of war has sometimes seemed to us like a research journey 
into the methodological unknown, it has at least challenged us to widen our 
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understanding both of war and of the place of languages within it. The business of war 
has seldom been a monolingual one. Whether we choose to notice it or not, the 
„ground of war‟ is almost always a linguistic landscape. 
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